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The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions
and Suggestions for Reconstruction
Shmuel L Becher*
& Esther Unger-Aviram**

ABSTRACT

The law of standardform contracts rests on intuitions. This Essay
explores these intuitions and examines intended consumer behavior
in common contractingcontexts. The first study in this Essay focuses
on the intent of consumers to read form contracts in four different
scenarios. The second examines the extent to which prevalent rational-economic factors influence potential consumers in their intent
to read form contracts.
Our findings support some of the common assumptions found in
contract law literature and contradict others. The findings from the
first questionnaire support the assumption that most consumers do
not read most of the contracts in their entirety at the time of contracting. However, the findings do not support the assumption found
in some literature that a substantialminority of consumers read their
contracts and thus might discipline sellers. The results also show that
many more consumers indicate a tendency to read contracts after the
fact.
The findings of the second questionnaireshow that at the time of
contracting,the most prevalent rational-economicreasonsfor reading
the contract are cost, length of contract and the prospects of influencing or changing contract terms. Cost and the chance to influence or
change contract terms are also detrimental factors in consumers' intention to read form contracts after the fact, as is the opportunity to
learn new things about their rights and obligationsunder the contract.
Quite surprisingly, however, legal jargon, print density and font size
are not key factors in consumers' decisions on whether to read their
contracts. As the Essay explains, all of these findings might serve
policy makers and courts in better designing the law that governs consumer form contracts.
* Associate Professor, Colman Law School-College of Management Academic Studies.
LL.B., Tel Aviv University (2001); LL.M (2003), J.S.D. (2005), Yale Law School. We thank Ben
Alarie, Eyal Zamir, and the participants at the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (2008) at
Cornell Law School for comments and discussions on earlier drafts. We also acknowledge the
kind support of the Research Foundation of The College of Management Academic Studies-School of Law, and thank Dana Lapidos and Renan Feldman for their able research
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INTRODUCTION

Do consumers read their standard form contracts? Academics, not
unlike the general public, seem to believe that they clearly do not. On
this basis, legal scholars frequently invite courts and legislatures to
protect consumers from allegedly biased contractual terms that sellers
draft.
However, the assumptions and propositions that appear in the literature on consumers' reading patterns and contracting behavior largely
rely on personal belief or intuition. Reliable and testable information
on this subject is hard to find.' Yet, basing the legal treatment of consumer contracts on intuition and general beliefs can lead to contradictory recommendations, as well as inefficient, unjust and erratic results.
This Essay attempts to take a modest yet important step to close
this gap. By providing data on consumers' contracting behavior, we
offer courts and legislatures initial tools that will better allow them to
address consumer contract law. We do so by examining two closely
related issues: first, whether consumers read their form contracts; and
second, what factors influence consumers' contracting behavior.
1. See generally, Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure
of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006).
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A basic assumption of contract law and theory is that parties are
well aware of the content of a contract prior to its formation. Presumably, reading the contract and negotiating its terms allows parties to
reach informed decisions. This in turn advances the welfare and enhances the autonomy of the contracting parties.
With various contracts, the assumption that contracting parties are
familiar with their content is often invalid. In the context of consumer
standard form contracts (SFCs), this assumption seems counterintuitive. Most often, SFCs involve parties of unequal bargaining power in
terms of market power, legal expertise, business sophistication and
commercial experience. Usually, there is little or no opportunity for
the consumer to negotiate the terms of the agreement, which is typically offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. 2
Numerous consumer transactions are governed by SFCs. Form contracts are used by insurance companies, internet service providers,
travel agencies, banks, credit card issuers and health clubs, to name
just a few. This Essay focuses on this most pervasive kind of contract.
Clearly, SFCs are a necessary product in the era of standardization
and mass-market transactions. The most apparent advantage of an
SFC is its potential to reduce transaction costs by simplifying and
shortening the negotiation process. Accordingly, sellers are not likely
to negotiate an SFC ex ante (that is, at the time of contracting) or to
allow deviations from pre-printed forms. Most frequently, the costs of
negotiating individual contracts will exceed the potential profit from
"routine" transactions. Hence, to avoid excessive transaction costs,
sellers prepare pre-printed forms and allow the potential consumer
little time or space to read, negotiate or contest the terms.
Furthermore, to avoid potential loss of any kind (legal or monetary), the typical seller does not empower its representatives (salespeople) to make changes in an SFC. Allegedly, since consumers usually
do not negotiate, read or understand SFCs, such contracts create a
potential market failure: asymmetric (or imperfect) information.3
Where consumers are not aware of the content of their contracts, sellers have a profit incentive to provide contractual terms of the lowest
quality possible.4 The terms included in SFCs may at times seek to
2. See generally, Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983).
3. See generally, Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts:The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723 (2008).
4. See generally, Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
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alter the legal rights that are usually granted to the consumer.5 Accordingly, academics call on courts and legislatures to intervene and
provide consumers with adequate protection and relief.
SFCs are ubiquitous, and their theoretical foundations have undergone enormous development. 6 Still, empirical findings on consumers'
behavior have been slow to appear.7 Very few writings rest on actual
data gathered from field or laboratory settings. This Essay seeks to
provide such data.
To achieve this goal, we administered two questionnaires. In the
first, we examined prospective consumers' contracting behavior in
four contexts. After analyzing the answers to the first questionnaire,
we learned, contrary to common assumptions in contract law literature, 8 that it is by no means the case that consumers do not read their
SFCs as a matter of course. To probe what factors play an important
role in consumers' decisions whether to read an SFC, we formulated a
second questionnaire. In it, we studied the extent to which main rational-economical variables, as commonly found in literature, indeed
influence consumers' intention to read SFCs ex ante and ex post.
Once again, and as detailed below, some of the results were counterintuitive, while others confirm common assumptions made by courts
and academics. 9
Part I of this Essay provides the three basic narratives pertaining to
consumer contracting behavior found in current literature. It provides
the reader with the necessary yet regrettably brief background to
SFCs, while the narratives are examined in detail thereafter. Part II
elaborates on the first study. It contains the method section, in which
we describe how we presented the first questionnaire to the respondents, the research results, and the implications of the questionnaire.
5. See generally, Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
L. REV. 211 (1995). Commentators frequently assert that SFCs exploit consumers' ignorance and are thus one-sided. Empirical examinations reinforce this view, at least when SFC
terms are compared with UCC default rules. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 677, 703, 713 (2007) (finding that "[End User License Agreements] are almost
always more pro-seller than the default rules of the UCC.").
6. For one example, see Symposium, "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts, 104
MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
7. For one survey of online contracting behavior see generally, Robert A. Hillman, Online
Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices:A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications,
in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 282 (Jane K. Winn
ed., 2006). For one recent study that contains data regarding this matter, see generally, Debra P.
Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer PsychologicalRealities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617 (2009).
8. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III.B-C.
STAN.
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Based on our findings, Part III moves forward to delineate our second
questionnaire and its results and implications. The last section of the
Essay, Part IV, concludes.
II.

THE THREE TALES OF CONSUMERS' CONTRACTING BEHAVIOR

Current literature that deals with consumer SFCs details three alternative "stories" about consumers' alleged contracting behavior.10 In
this section, we outline these stories, explain their rationales, and
point to their origins.
A.

The Conventional Story: Consumers do not read their SFCs

The conventional narrative of consumer behavior and contract law
assumes that consumers do not read the entire contract when entering
into their contracts." They refrain from doing so, according to this
line of argument, for various good reasons.12 Scholars suggest categorizing those reasons into three groups: (i) rational-economic reasons
(e.g., reading costs that exceed the anticipated gains from reading);
(ii) cognitive causes (e.g., information overload and self-serving biases
that lead consumers to believe they are risk-free); and (iii) social rationales (e.g., the fear of being conceived by others as suspicious and
uncooperative). 13
By and large, the basic assumption that consumers do not read
SFCs in their entirety, however persuasive, has not been established
empirically. 14 Instead, writers seem to regard this assumption as common knowledge. Scholars indeed recognize the paucity of empirical
data on this subject,' 5 noting that the literature does not furnish such
statements with solid proof. By and large it is all intuition.16
10. See infra Part I.A-C.
11. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (2002).
12. See id. at 445-54.
13. See id.
14. For a recent exception in the field of software license agreements, see generally Yannis
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts, (Oct. 6, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1443256.
15. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1179 (stating that "[v]irtually every scholar who has written
about contracts of adhesion" accepts the idea that "the adhering party is in practice unlikely to
have read the standard terms.") See also, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1217 n.45 ("There
appears to be little direct empirical data on this [actual contracting behavior] point"); Hillman,
supra note 1, at 841 n.24 ("Few empirical studies examine consumer reading of standard forms in
the paper word. Most commentators merely cite or quote Todd Rakoff's piece on contracts of
adhesion for the proposition that consumers do not read standard forms.").
16. For a few examples, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 679, 680 (2004) (noting that "commentators agree that buyers, or the vast majority
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Based on the assumption that consumers do not read SFCs, regulators, courts and academics call for intervention aimed at protecting
consumers from invidious hidden contractual terms that exploit their
ignorance.' 7 However, before this generalized assumption regarding
consumers' reluctance to read is used as a justification for legal intervention, further solid insight is warranted. Accordingly, the first hypothesis we tested in our study is that most consumers do not read
SFCs in their entirety18 at the ex ante stage. 19
B.

A "Law and Economics" Version: You Can Fool Some
Consumers Sometimes, But You Can't Fool All the
Consumers All the Time 20

Whereas virtually all commentators agree that consumers do not
read their SFCs as a matter of course, some academics argue that a
fraction of consumers do read some of their contracts some of the
time. Under relevant circumstances, the argument contends, this phenomenon (of partial reading) may suffice to discipline sellers to draft
fair and efficient SFCs.2t As explained next, whether or not some conof them, do not read the terms presented to them by sellers."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment,
Unconscionabilityin Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1163 (1976) (opining that "[i]n general the consumer will not have read any of the clauses, and most will be written in obscure legal
terms."). Sometimes this assumption partly relies on one's personal contracting habits. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Contract, not Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech Consumers Meet Their
Consumer Protection Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION
ECONoMY', 205, 227 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006). ("[I]t seems clear that most consumers-of whom I
am proudly one-never bother to read these terms anyhow: we know what they say on the issue
of firm liability, and adopt a strategy of 'rational ignorance' to economize on the use of our
time.").
17. For one example see Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of
Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700, 730-34 (1992)
(asserting that since consumers do not read their SFCs and in light of sellers' superior ability to
handle the risk of litigation in distant forums, it would be efficient to assign such a risk to
sellers).
18. The focus on reading the entire contract (rather than parts of it) is due to the fact that
harsh terms in one part of an SFC can be balanced by concessions made in another. In other
words, without reading the contract as a whole, one is not likely in most cases to evaluate it
correctly.
19. As detailed below, we examine this hypothesis while keeping in mind the question of
whether specific factors or circumstances (which relate to the nature of the transaction at stake)
can influence the inclination of consumers to read their SFCs. For example, our questionnaire
addresses the question of whether consumers will change their contracting behavior when the
SFC at stake concerns the well-being of another (dependent) individual, as opposed merely to
potential monetary loss. The second study examines factors that relate to the contract itself,
rather than the kind of transaction one enters.
20. With apologies to Bob Marley. For further explanation, see THE WAILERs, Get Up, Stand
Up, on BURNIN' (Island Records 1973).
21. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). Another premise
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sumers indeed read their form contracts is a crucial point that might
affect the need for regulating the market for contract terms.
This (generally anti-intervention) law and economics approach is
premised on competitive market forces, which allegedly generate a
desired equilibrium whereby vendors have adequate incentives to
draft efficient standardized terms. Once again, the proponents of this
approach acknowledge that SFC terms are not typically read by consumers prior to finalizing the transaction. Yet they argue that, in competitive markets, the fact that some consumers (hereinafter, marginal
consumers) do read contractual provisions, and are willing to search
for better ones, should suffice to deter sellers from incorporating onesided terms in their SFCs. By this reasoning, a vendor that incorporates unfair or unjust provisions in its contract risks losing marginal
consumers to a competitor that offers preferable terms. As firms respond to consumers in the aggregate and provide products that will
match their preferences, competitive market forces will induce firms
to refrain from exploiting consumers through self-serving clauses. According to this logic, market pressure, generated by a group of marginal consumers that operate in a competitive market, will substantially
reduce the need for legal intervention in the content of SFCs. In other
words, a dynamic that makes legal intervention in SFCs unnecessary
will emerge in markets in which the cost of losing marginal consumers
(due to the use of unfair contractual terms) will outweigh the benefits
of extorting non-marginal consumers (who remain subject to the unfair and biased contractual provisions). 22
Taking this approach into account, the policy response to the fear of
unfair SFCs should be limited to encouraging drawing up contracts
using simple, short and plain language. Such contracts will enlarge the
fraction of consumers that are willing to invest resources in reading
SFCs and will assist marginal consumers to signal their discontent with
the given SFC. In addition, regulators should promote competition,
which will render marginal consumers more powerful and will ensure
that they have sufficient options to switch to, thereby indicating their
discontent with biased SFCs.
As before, the argument about an informed minority of consumers
who read SFCs and bring about efficient and fair market equilibrium
has not been tested empirically. Academics address this argument
in this context is that for the fraction of consumers who read the entire contract to discipline
sellers to draft fair and efficient contracts, "at least one-third of consumers must be informed to
protect the remaining consumers' interests." Goldman, supra note 17, at 719.
22. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability ofan Informed
Minority to Correctfor Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996).
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without providing any empirical data on the matter. Consider, for instance, the following quote:
While it is an article offaith that most purchasers will not read terms
[of SFCs], it is also plausible that at least some purchasers will....
Much of the legal literature on SFCs, at least since the path-breaking work of Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde, has dealt with the conditions under which the presence of reading buyers can serve as a
proxy for nonreading buyers. 23
Whereas the first tale presented above assumes that consumers do
not read SFCs as a matter of course, the law and economics version of
consumer contracting behavior discussed in this Part presumes that a
substantial minority of consumers do. Accordingly, there might be
good reason not to hasten to intervene in the market for contract
terms. Hence, our study further tests the prediction that at least a
third of consumers read SFCs in their entirety at the time of contracting (the ex ante stage).
C.

The Hindsight Tale: (More) Consumers Read SFCs after the Fact

Some academics submit that the mere fact that consumers have their
SFCs available after entering the transaction does not necessarily entail greater readership at this later point in time. Hillman, for instance, argues that "consumers are as unlikely to read terms after a
transaction as during one." 24 Yet, a third theme in current scholarship
asserts that reading contracts is indeed much more likely to occur ex
post than ex ante. 25 Next, we delineate why ex post reading matters
and explain the rationales for this alleged phenomenon.
Ex post reading is important for various reasons. Although parties
form their understandings at the time of contracting, reading the contract ex post can prove highly beneficial. The reasons consumers read
their contracts at the ex post stage are mainly two. First, they might
want to become familiar with their rights and obligations and be able
to respond accordingly. Second, consumers might seek to alter the
contract they have previously entered. At this relatively late stage,
the consumer perceives that the costs of accepting the conditions of
the contract may be too high or outweigh the expected benefits, so the
contract should be (re)examined and rectified. If the losses are too
23. Gillette, supra note 16, at 690-91 (emphasis added).
24. Hillman, supra note 1, at 844.
25. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation,14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 303
(2008). This third tale deals with the ex post stage where a dispute or a problem arises (that is,
the point in time after the item or service purchased has failed to satisfy the consumer's expectations). See id.
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great to bear, or they outweigh the benefits, the individual consumer
will seek to cut or lessen them.
There are several reasons for a seller to agree to renegotiate an SFC
after the consumer has purchased a product or service. First, sellers
fear undermining their own reputations by insisting on the language of
one-sided contracts. Once a product has failed to satisfy consumers'
expectations, sellers can quite easily identify buyers who are assertive
enough to speak out and insist upon the legitimacy of their complaints. In many cases, those consumers will be granted relief, because sellers will either aspire to minimize contact with
"troublemakers" or fear undermining their reputations. At the same
time, aggrieved consumers who do not display persistence and assertiveness will bear losses. This practice is termed "ex post discrimination." 26 Such discrimination becomes even more evident (and
problematic) once we realize that standardized exculpatory terms, if
read, may deter consumers from pursuing their rights and seeking
compensation. 27 Thus, where ex post discrimination occurs, all consumers will be offered biased, unfair terms, and only assertive marginal consumers will get their way, after negotiating their SFCs.
Additionally, sellers might employ biased contracts but regularly
waive contractual rights in order to enhance their reputation. 28 That
is, they might incorporate unfair terms just to waive them later on.
According to this explanation, when aggrieved (ex post) consumers
turn to vendors for relief, the latter will first refer them to the relevant
(albeit imbalanced) contractual provision. Thereafter, vendors will inform their consumers (or at least the more persistent ones) that their
consumer-friendly policy (in the case at stake or more generally) is to
forgo their own contractual rights. 29
26. Another possible kind of discrimination is an ex ante one, where sellers provide different
consumers with different terms at the time of contracting (presumably employing more egregious terms with non-sophisticated consumers). However, and as we rationalized in the introduction, it seems that this is not a common phenomenon. For an empirical assertion that this is
indeed not the case in the field of software license agreements, see Marotta-Wurgler,supra note
5, at 680 ("EULAs associated with products targeted toward the general public are not significantly more pro-seller than the EULAs associated with business-oriented products. . . . I am
able to cleanly test, and reject, the hypothesis that sellers actively discriminate between buyer
types through the terms they offer to them").
27. See Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas:
A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to
Sue, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 83 (1997).
28. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 27; see also Gillette, supra note 16.
29. To use the behavioral economics jargon, sellers may use this tactic in order to cause an
anchoring effect: setting a rigid starting point, and thereafter negotiating down.
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The literature offers another basic strategy for ex post negotiation,
which leads vendors to waive their contracting rights (as formulated in
the SFC). According to this strategy, vendors might provide consumers with ex post relief as long as the latter do not engage in opportunistic behavior. 30 This implies that ex post discrimination allows firms
to insist on the lopsided contractual terms when dealing with badfaith, unfaithful or "problematic" consumers. At the same time, sellers will exercise discretion and exhibit flexibility aimed at retaining
"good customers." Once again, vendors do so by not insisting on the
harsh contractual terms originally incorporated into the relevant SFC.
Moreover, if a good enough information flow exists, sellers might
refrain from using too-harsh SFCs from the very beginning. This
might be the case when experienced (ex post) consumers can share
their experiences with potential (ex ante) consumers effectively and
efficiently. Once potential consumers can easily receive credible and
valuable information from experienced consumers who have run into
problems with a given seller or SFC, sellers might worry about their
reputation. This, in turn, might discipline sellers and encourage them
not to use (overly) biased contracts. 3 1
Therefore, although somewhat counterintuitive, ex post reading indeed matters. From the perspectives of both consumers and sellers,
ample reasons seem to exist for not reading SFCs ex ante while leaving their terms open to ex post negotiation. According to this line of
reasoning, whereas it is basically true that contracting parties do not
negotiate SFCs ex ante, actual contracting around the SFC content is
more likely to take place at the ex post stage. This phenomenon, accompanied by sellers' reputational concerns, might deter sellers from
drafting egregiously one-sided contracts. 32 In addition, it may deter
sellers from insisting on the lopsided contractual language. Generally
speaking, this potential phenomenon also renders legal intervention
less necessary.
Once again, none of these speculations regarding ex post reading
and negotiation between businesses and consumers are borne out by
any findings of which we are aware. Thus, this line of argument points
to the next and last hypothesis examined in our first study: that the
30. See Gillette, supra note 16; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Market, 104 MICH. L. REv. 827 (2006).
31. For a detailed development of this argument, its pitfalls and its potential, see Becher &
Zarsky, supra note 30.
32. Indeed, although EULAs seem to be consistently one-sided, they do not reach the most
extreme possible bias toward sellers. See Marotta-Wugler, supra note 5, at 703.
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proportion of consumers who read SFCs ex post is significantly larger
than the proportion who read them ex ante, at the time of contracting.
III.

THE FIRST STUDY:

Do

CONSUMERS READ

THEIR CONTRACTS?

To expand our understanding of how SFCs impact consumer behavior and decision-making, we set out to examine the tendency of potential consumers to read or negotiate SFCs. Gathering this data is a first
step in obtaining a better comprehension of the ways in which policymakers should approach the unsettled issue of legal intervention in
consumer contracts. Accordingly, the purpose of the first study is to
examine the three narratives on consumers' behavior as detailed in
the previous section. Below, we elaborate the sample, the questionnaires, the results and their implications.
A.

Method

Sample. One hundred and forty-seven respondents volunteered to
fill out a questionnaire. The population that participated in this study
was a heterogeneous group of students from two different academic
institutions. The students were studying toward a Masters degree in
management, business administration or legal studies (n=96), a Bachelors degree in law (n=23), or had already completed a Masters degree (n=23) in other areas (five respondents did not indicate their
degrees). 33 At least forty-eight of the respondents were females and at
least eighty-nine respondents were males (ten respondents did not indicate gender), with various income levels. 34
Questionnaire.Two versions of the questionnaire were designed to
examine the propensity of individuals to read SFCs. Each version included two ex ante and two ex post scenarios, and contained four different types of scenarios that any individual respondent was likely to
33. Eighty-nine students had no prior knowledge in contract or consumer law; fifty-eight students had completed both contract and consumer law courses.
34. We regard our participants' diversity as one of our study's valuable aspects. As the
records indicate, participants' education, social status and age varied substantially, so their behavior may better represent the behavior found in the real population. For instance, respondents' monthly income level ranged from up to NIS 5,000 (n=69) to NIS 5,001-7500 (n=45) to
NIS 7,501-10,000 (n=14) and higher (n=16). As of June 29, 2009, the exchange rate is approximately NIS 3.95 to USD 1 (the average monthly Israeli income is approximately NIS 7,600). See
generally The Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel), http://www.cbs.gov.illreader. For an argument that there is a significant positive correlation between the annual income and education
level of a participant and the tendency to report reading SFCs, see Stark & Choplin, supra note
7. For a discussion of the sample and its possible shortcomings see infra note 63.
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encounter, some more often than others, some of higher cost and
value than others.
The different scenarios allowed us to examine how far generalizations about consumer tendency to behave consistently in all ex ante
and ex post scenarios could be made. Each version included scenarios
that occurred in the following four consumer-business relationships:
bank, car-rental agency, laundry services, and prestigious nursery
school. The first three scenarios, although different in context, are
similar in that they do not concern the wellbeing of a dependent individual (i.e., a child). In these scenarios, any wrongdoing may result in
monetary damages, some greater than others. The fourth scenario,
the nursery school, differs from the other three in that not only monetary damage may be incurred, but the physical and mental wellbeing
of a dependent child may be at risk, also. Therefore, although this
scenario indeed portrays a situation that one may commonly encounter, the responsibility and potential damage and loss are of a different
nature and may therefore call for more cautious behavior on the consumer's part. Put differently, these diverse scenarios allowed us to
examine whether a consumer's behavior might depend on the particular context of the SFC at stake.
The questionnaires were randomly distributed to the participants.
Each participant filled out one questionnaire. Below, we detail the
instructions and scenarios contained in the questionnaires.
Ex Ante Instructions and Scenarios
The instructions for the ex ante scenarios were as follows: "Described below are several events which we are all likely to encounter.
Please read each of the events and indicate your contracting behavior
accordingly."
In the first version of the questionnaire, the two ex ante scenarios
involved renting a car and opening a bank account. In the first, participants were told the following: "You fly out for a vacation. You
have landed at the airport, and now you want to rent a car for a week.
Before you are five car-rental counters (Hertz, Rent-a-Car, Avis. .
You go up to one of the counters, at random, and ask for a compact
car (category A). The agent hands you a standard rental contract.
Will you read the contract?" Next, the respondent had to choose
among one of the four alternatives provided:
(1) I will read through the entire contract, and then I'll sign it.
(2) I will skim through the contract, or read part of it, and then I'll
sign it.

(3) I will sign the contract without reading it, but I'll take it with me
to read at a later time.
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(4)1 will sign the contract without reading it, and I will not read it at
a later time.
In the bank scenario, respondents were told the following: "You
open a checking account at a bank. The clerk hands you a standard
contract to sign. Will you read the contract?" Here too, the respondents were asked to identify their contracting behavior from among
the four alternatives listed above.
As noted, the second version also contained two ex ante scenarios,
one about laundry services, the other, registration at a nursery school.
The laundry scenario read: "You deliver some clothes for washing and
ironing at the laundry. The owner hands you an invoice/receipt for
your signature; on the back of it is a list of the items you have delivered, the service required, and several more conditions. Will you read
the invoice/receipt?" As before, the respondents were asked to choose
their contracting behavior out of the four alternatives presented
above.
Lastly, the nursery school scenario read: "You register your twoyear-old child at a private and prestigious nursery school, after being
on a waiting list for several months. Once your child has been accepted, as part of the registration procedure the teacher asks you to
sign a contract. How will you act?" Once again, the respondents were
asked to choose their contracting behavior from among the four alternatives noted above.
Ex Post Instructions and Scenarios
The ex post scenarios related to the same four themes listed above.
The two ex post scenarios in the first version included the laundry and
the nursery school. The laundry scenario read: "You handed in a suit
for dry cleaning, but you forgot to pick it up. Two and a half months
later, just before an important family occasion, you looked for the suit
and remembered that you hadn't collected it from the cleaners. You
call them, and they tell you that they no longer have the suit because
more than two months have gone since you handed it in. Which of the
following best describes your response to this incident?" The respondents were then asked to mark their chosen course of behavior. The
instructions further noted: "If more than one response is possible, or
you choose a sequence of responses, please write 1 next to your first
response, 2 next to your second response, and so on." The options
included the following five:
(1) 1 will give in. It was up to me to collect the suit on time.

(2) I will try to pressure the cleaners for compensation despite their
answer.
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(3) I will consult a lawyer. Perhaps the owner of the dry cleaners is
not acting in a legal manner.
(4) I will read the invoice I got, setting out the conditions of cleaning and the responsibilities of each party.
(5) IfI conclude that there are grounds for my claims I'll sue the dry
cleaners.
The ex post nursery school scenario read as follows: "Your child is
enrolled at a private and much sought-after nursery school. Toward
the middle of the school year you are informed that you have to go
abroad with your family, for work purposes, for two years. The nursery-school teacher informs you that because you are leaving in the
middle of the school year you must continue to pay the fees for the
remaining five months of the year.35 Which of the following best describes your response to this incident?" Here too, the instructions
were identical to those provided in the ex post laundry scenario.
In the second version, the two ex post scenarios addressed a car
rental and bank scenario, with identical instructions. The car rental
scenario read: "You fly out for a vacation, and rent a compact car
(category A) for a week. The following day you have driven far out of
town and you realize that the air-conditioning in the car isn't working.
You call the rental company. They tell you that considering your location and the kind of problem, they are not obliged to help you, and
you must manage on your own. Which of the following best describes
your response to this incident?" The second ex post scenario involved
a bank incident which read: "Your bank debit card was stolen, and
used for unapproved purchases. 36 YOU informed the bank within 24
hours. The bank refuses to credit your account, claiming that this was
the third time you had reported the theft of your card in the previous
12 months." Once again, the respondents were asked: "Which of the
following best describes your response to this incident."
B.

Results

In this part, we present the results of the hypotheses testing. First,
we address those concerning the ex ante stage, and then we discuss
those concerning the ex post stage.
1. The Ex Ante Stage
Our first hypothesis was that most consumers do not read SFCs in
their entirety at the ex ante stage. In the car rental scenario, a large
35. The respondents were told that the fees amount to NIS 10,000.
36. The respondents were told that the unauthorized purchases were in the amount of NIS
3,000.
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majority of the respondents, 81% (N=61), stated that they would not
read the contract in its entirety. However, 60% of the respondents
(N=45) indicted that they would skim through or read parts of it prior
to signing. In the bank account scenario, 92% of the respondents
(N=69) said that they would not read the contract in its entirety.
Again, a substantial proportion of the respondents, 47% (N=35), indicated that they would skim through or read parts of the contract
before signing. As expected, a solid majority indicated no intention to
read SFCs in one of ex ante scenarios of the second version, as well.
In the laundry scenario, 75% of the respondents (N=54) reported that
they would not read the contract in its entirety. Consistent with the
previous two ex ante scenarios, 61% of the respondents (N=44) indicted that they would either skim through or read selected parts of
the contract prior to signing.
The results in these three scenarios have much in common. In all
three cases, large majorities indicated no intention to read the SFCs in
their entirety. Yet, a large proportion of the respondents stated their
inclination to skim though the contract or read it selectively.
Interestingly, different results were found in the nursery school scenario. Here, only 24% (N=24) indicated no intention to read the contract in its entirety. In other words, 76% of the respondents (N=55)
stated that they would read it through. An additional 17% (N=12)
said that they would either skim through or read only selected parts of
the contract prior to signing it. The remaining 7% (N=5) indicated
that they would sign the contract without reading it, but intended to
read it at a later time. Table 1 below summarizes these results.
TABLE

1.

PERCENTAGE (PROPORTION)

OF CONSUMERS WHO

REPORTED A TENDENCY NOT TO READ

SFCS

Version 1

Version 2

Car rental
81% (61/75)

Laundry
75% (54/72)

Bank Account
92% (69/75)

Nursery School
24% (17/72)

EX ANTE

Thus, the hypothesis that the vast majority of consumers do not
read SFCs receives partial support. In three out of the four scenarios
(i.e., bank, laundry, car rental scenarios), consumers indeed reported
that they would not read SFCs in their entirety at the ex ante stage.
By contrast, in the nursery school scenario, most consumers reported
an inclination to read the contract in its entirety prior to signing.
Therefore, the hypothesis is partially supported.
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Our second hypothesis was that a substantial minority - at least a
third - of consumers are inclined to read SFCs in their entirety at the
ex ante stage, thus disciplining sellers. To test this hypothesis, we used
Z tests to determine if the difference between the sample mean of
each scenario and the theoretical mean of the population (at least
33.3%) was statistically significant.
These analyses show that in two scenarios - the car rental and the
bank account - a significantly smaller proportion than one third
(33.3%) of the consumers reported a tendency to read the contract ex
ante: z = -2.39, p = 0.008; and z = -3. 92, p = 0.000, respectively. In the

laundry scenario, 18/72 (25%) of the respondents indicated that they
would read the contract ex ante. This is not significantly different
from the proposed one third: z = -1.36, p = 0.08. Of course, in the
nursery scenario, a proportion significantly larger than one third indicated that they would tend to read the contract ex ante: z = 13.18, p =
0.000. Thus, in two scenarios (car rental and bank) out of the four, the
proportion of the consumers that report a tendency to read the entire
contract ex ante was significantly smaller than the assumed one third.
2. The Ex Post Stage
Our third hypothesis was that the proportion of consumers who
read SFCs ex post (once having encountered a problem) will be significantly larger than the proportion who read them ex ante (at the time
of contracting). Here too, Z tests were used to determine if, in each
scenario, the difference between the intent to read SFCs ex post was
significantly larger than the intent to read them ex ante.
Indeed, a significantly larger proportion of consumers reported that
they would read the contract ex post (rather than ex ante) in three out
of the four scenarios: car rental, z = 4.99, p = 0.000; bank account, z =
17.69, p = 0.000; laundry, z = 14.54, p = 0.000.37 Once again, the only
37. Furthermore, a large proportion of respondents indicated that they may read SFCs ex post
as their second reaction. For instance, in the laundry scenario, whereas forty-five out of the
sixty-two people who answered this question indicated they would read the SFCs as their first
reaction, fifteen indicated they would do so as their second reaction (assuming their first reaction
had not resolved the dispute). This amounts to sixty out of the sixty-two respondents (97%) who
might read the SFCs as their first or second response. In the nursery school scenario, thirty-five
out of fifty-six who answered this question indicated they would read the SFCs as their initial
reaction, while an additional twenty reported they might read the SFCs as their second reaction
(again, assuming their first course of action had not resolved the dispute). This amounts to fiftyfive out of fifty-six respondents (98%). In the car rental scenario, twenty out of forty-seven
claimed they would read the SFCs as their first response, and an additional twenty-five might
read the SFCs as their second choice of behavior. This amounts to forty-five out of forty-seven
respondents (96%) who might read the SFCs as their first or second reaction. Lastly, in the
stolen credit card scenario, twenty-eight out of fifty-one indicated they would read SFCs as their
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exception was the nursery school scenario, in which a significant majority of the respondents indicated that they would read the entire
contract before signing it, z = -1.83, p = 0.03. Diagram 1 below summarizes the comparison of the two stages.
1. Percentage of consumers that read SFCs ex post as
compared with the percentage that read them ex ante
76
73
8063
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-
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Discussion and Implications

The major contributions of this study are twofold. First, it provides
a preliminary empirical test of the assumptions found in the literature
with respect to consumer contracting behavior. By and large, current
writings merely speculate on how consumers behave with respect to
SFCs. This study, however, examines potential consumers' reported
behavioral tendency in four different scenarios. Although we measure
potential and not actual behavior, this is an improvement on mere
speculation. The measurement of actual consumer behavior is indeed
warranted, but our results show that even in intent, some of the assumptions provided in the literature receive empirical support,
whereas others do not. The results of this study, therefore, justify further investigation of actual consumer behavior. Until such data is
gathered, our results may assist policymakers and courts in formulating better guidelines for the legal treatment of SFCs.
Second, the findings negate some current assumptions about consumers' behavior at the ex ante stage and reinforce others. Our findings show that the vast majority of consumers do not intend to read
the entire SFCs into which they enter.3 Thus, policy recommendations aimed at protecting consumers at the time of contracting seem
warranted insofar as they are based on the fear of imperfect information, pertaining to contractual parts (or contracts) that consumers do
first choice, and nineteen as their second choice. This amounts to forty-seven out of fifty-one
respondents (92%) who might read SFCs as their first or second choice.
38. This finding is in line with Stark & Choplin, supra note 7.
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not read and of which they are therefore not aware.39 However, the
results also indicate that potential consumers report a tendency to
read parts of, or skim though, SFCs. Market forces are more likely to
suffice and deter sellers from incorporating one-sided terms with respect to conspicuous (salient) contractual aspects that consumers read
and understand. 40 Future research is thus required to determine which
parts of SFCs consumers tend to read or skim through, and which
parts they do not.
Furthermore, the study validates a current assumption regarding
consumers' behavior at the ex post stage. The data reveals that most
potential consumers report a clear tendency to read SFCs as a first
reaction once a legal dispute arises. This implies that policymakers
should encourage a flow of information among consumers, from experienced ones (who read the SFC ex post) to potential ones (those
who consider entering a transaction, at the ex ante stage). 4' Accordingly, when courts decide SFC cases, one factor to be considered is the
ex post-ex ante flow of information. When a strong flow exists, vendors are more likely to have a profit incentive to refrain from using
one-sided clauses in their SFCs.
The ex post findings also support the assumption that the terms
contained in SFCs may indeed influence and shape consumers' behavior in a broader sense. The fact that many consumers consult their
SFCs as their first choice of action once a dispute surfaces indicates
that consumers tend to attribute importance to the content of their
contracts. In this sense, it is only reasonable to assume that most consumers believe they are bound (at least to a certain degree) to the
contract's language. This might strengthen the need to protect consumers against unscrupulous or unconscionable terms, which consumers nevertheless tend to perceive as binding. 42
Lastly, the data demonstrates that it might be a mistake, at least in
some contexts, to address SFCs without distinguishing among the
many different kinds of consumer contracts and fields of commerce.
The first study indicates that some contracts are read significantly
more than others. As described, one of the scenarios explored in this
39. Slightly restated, legal intervention is particularly defensible pertaining to unread and unnoticed (i.e., non-salient) contractual terms. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1244.
40. Note, however, that consumers' ability to understand and absorb the information they
encounter in their SFCs (rather than merely reading it) deserves a distinct study, which we hope
to perform separately.
41. See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 30, at 357-65. This conclusion is further supported by the
fact that many additional consumers report the intention to scrutinize the form contract as their
second choice of action.
42. See, e.g., Stolle & Slain, supra note 27.

2010]1

THE LAW OF STANDARD Fom CONTRAcrs

217

study - the nursery school - yielded results that differ substantially

from the others. One possible explanation for the high percentage of
reading consumers in this scenario is its exceptional and special nature: it involves mainly wellbeing, rather than monetary aspects. Another possible explanation might be found in the fact that the
potential consumers were told they were on a waiting list for a few
months. This may enhance consumers' anticipation and commitment.
We hence suggest that future research focus on obtaining a deeper
understanding of the factors that lead consumers to read SFCs. Such
research should focus on factors that relate to the SFC itself (e.g.,
font, language, length - as we examine in our next study below) as well
as on factors that relate to the nature of the transaction at stake. Diverse SFCs might justify different legal treatment. Contracts that are
read by most (or many) consumers will usually not justify the same
concerns, scrutiny and protective measures as SFCs that are not read.

IV.

THE SECOND STUDY: RATIONAL-ECONoMIc FACTORS

The first study showed that some consumers read some of their contracts some of the time. It also demonstrated that some contracts are
read significantly more often than others. With this in mind, we designed a second questionnaire to clarify further the main factors that
lead consumers to read (or not read) SFCs. As noted, the literature
details three kinds of factors that prevent consumers from reading

their SFCs: rational-economic, cognitive, and social.43 Our second
study focuses on the first of these.
Roughly defined, "rational-economic" refers to factors that can be
attributed to a rational decision-making process. For instance, the
smaller the font of the contract, the harder it is to read. This is a
relatively objective factor. Similarly, other factors being equal, the
longer the contract, the more time it takes to become familiar with the
contract, and hence, the more consumers will tend not to read it. To
complete the list, aside from font size and length of contract, the second survey probes for the following additional four factors: (1) cost
(i.e., the price of the transaction at stake); (2) the prospects of changing the contract's language; (3) the possibility to learn about the rights
and obligations of the contracting parties by reading the contract; and
(4) the similarity of the diverse contracts found in a given field or kind
of transaction.
The motivation to focus on rational-economic factors is threefold.
First, the literature on this group of factors is most robust, and ra43. See supra Part I.A.
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tional-economic factors, such as those examined here, recur in the
literature 44 as well as in court rulings. 45 Yet, there is a gap in the contract literature relating to the particular variables and their impacts on
consumer contracting behavior. Second, whereas the actual influence
of cognitive and social factors seems to be in dispute, 46 scholars widely
agree that economic factors do play a significant role in consumers'
behavior. Third, these factors are more objective in nature and are
relatively free of the subjective influences and biases that may occur
with cognitive and social factors.
Since the literature does not identify which rational-economic factors have a stronger impact on consumer behavior than others, our
hypothesis here is general. We therefore examine next whether and to
what degree rational-economic factors influence consumers' intent to
read a car rental SFC, both ex ante and ex post.
A car rental scenario was chosen for several reasons. First, it recurs
in court rulings and in the contract literature. 47 Second, it is relatively
common. 48 Third, a car rental scenario also appears in our first study,
in which we found that only 19% of consumers reported an intention
to read the contract ex ante and 45% reported an intention to do so ex
44. Numerous commentators note rational-economic factors as key reasons that lead consumers not to read SFCs ex ante. Eisenberg, for instance, argues that "(t)he verbal and legal obscurity of preprinted terms renders the cost of searching out and deliberating on these terms
exceptionally high. . . . Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the form taker knows he will
find difficult or impossible to fully understand, . . . which are unlikely to be worth the costs of
search and processing, and which probably aren't subject to revision in any event, a rational form
taker will typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms." Eisenberg, supra note 5,
at 243. For another example, see Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 30, at 832 ("Indeed, the cost of
becoming informed may exceed the benefit, resulting in rational ignorance of hidden traps in
contracts that competition may not dispel.").
45. See, e.g., the famous case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960). Negating a standard term that limited the warranty protection for a new car, the court
explained that all car manufacturers used the same unfair disclaimer. Id. at 385-86.
46. The recent debate between Bar-Gill and Epstein serves as a good example. See Oren BarGill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Richard
A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 992 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (involving car
rental agent who testified that she had never seen a customer read the reverse side of a rental
agreement); Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 242 ("[F]orm takers often encounter form contracts
under circumstances that encourage the form taker to exert only minimal effort to understand
the preprinted terms. Few hurried travelers, for example, will pause to read the boilerplate
provisions of their car rental agreements."); Irma. S. Russell, Got Wheels? Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral PrivateOrdering, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
137 (2006); Stark & Choplin, supra note 7, at 688-92 (including a car rental contract as part of a
survey).
48. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 47, at 139 (opining that the most widespread consumer leasing contract is renting a car) (citing Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight
Shifts to the Uniform Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 649 (2003)).
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post. Interestingly, among the three scenarios that exhibited low ex
ante reading and higher ex post reading, the gap between the two
stages was the smallest in this case.
A.

Method

We present below the sample, the case study, and the questionnaire
used in the second study to examine the rational-economic factors
that influence consumers' intent to read SFCs ex ante and ex post.
Sample. One hundred and twenty respondents volunteered to fill
out questionnaires (see details below). All were students studying toward a Masters degree in management, legal studies or business administration (n=90), or a Bachelors degree in law (n=30). 4 9 At least
sixty-five respondents were females and at least forty-seven were
males (eight respondents did not indicate gender), with various income levels.
Questionnaire.The instructions read: "Described below is an event
which each of us may encounter. Please read the event and indicate
the extent to which each of the factors listed below will influence your
behavior." The ex ante scenario stated: "You have flown out for a
two-week vacation . . . . You have landed at the local airport and

would now like to rent a car for two weeks. There are five car rental
counters from which you may rent ....

You randomly choose one of

the counters and ask to rent a compact car (category A) for a fortnight. The salesperson hands you a car rental contract for your signature. Please indicate the extent to which each of the factors listed
below will influence your intent to read the rental contract in its
entirety."
The ex post scenario read: "The day after you rented the car, you
took a drive out of town. When you tried to turn on the air conditioning you found out that it was out of order. You called the car rental
company to see what could be done. They replied that they were
under no obligation to assist you, as you had driven beyond the city
limits, and you would have to manage on your own. Given the above,
please indicate the extent to which each of the factors listed below will
influence your intent to read in its entirety the car rental contract you
have already signed."
The list of factors appearing after each scenario read: "Size of the
writing (font) used in the contract; density of the print; the (monetary)
cost of the car rental; length of the contract (number of pages); type of
49. Thirty students had no prior knowledge in contract or consumer law; ninety students had
completed both contract and consumer law courses.
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language used in the contract (legal wording, terms, definitions); opportunity to improve or change the contract terms and conditions
through negotiation; opportunity to learn important things about the
car rental transaction that were not indicated by the salesperson; and
the assumption that the other car rental counters would offer contracts with similar conditions and terms." On both the ex ante and the
ex post scenarios, the volunteers were asked to rate each of the factors
on a 1-7 Likert-type scale from 1= no influence, through 4= some
influence, to 7= very strong influence.
B.

Results

Listed in Table 2 and Table 3 below are the factors and mean rating
scores (with standard deviations) for the ex ante and the ex post scenarios, respectively. In each of the tables, the factors are listed according to the mean score, ranking from the highest to the lowest.
Generally, results show that all of the factors influenced individual
intent to read the SFC in its entirety, both ex ante and ex post, although some had a significantly stronger impact than others.
Ex ante. The factors that most strongly influenced consumers' intent to read the SFC ex ante were cost of transaction, length of contract and opportunity to change/improve contract terms. The factors
that ranked lowest on intent to read ex ante include contract density,
font size, and legal language. To determine whether the rankings significantly differ from each other, paired t-tests were performed. Results show no significant difference between the top three ranking
factors, i.e., cost of transaction and length of contract, and between
length of contract and opportunity to change/improve contract terms.
However, significant differences were found between the opportunity to change/improve contract terms (ranking third) and the assumption that the other car rental counters would offer contracts with
similar conditions and terms (ranking fourth), and all other lower
ranking factors. This indicates that although all of the factors had an
impact on intent to read SFCs ex ante, cost of transaction, length of
contract and opportunity to change/improve contract terms had a significantly stronger impact in comparison to the other remaining factors (i.e., similarity to other car rental contracts, density, opportunity
to learn new things about the contract, font size and legal language).
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TABLE

2.

MEAN SCORES, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND PAIRED

COMPARISONS (T-TESTS)

OF RATIONAL-ECONOMIC FACTORS

INFLUENCING INTENT TO READ EX ANTE

Factor

Ex ante
Mean
(stdev)

1. Cost of Transaction

5.66
(1.41)

2. Length of Contract

5.39
(1.50)

3. Opportunity to
Change or Improve
Contract Terms

5.30
(1.58)

4. Similarity (Other
Car Rental Contracts)

4.79
(1.63)

5. Density

4.74
(1.53)

6. Opportunity to
Learn New Things
About the Contract

4.70
(1.60)

7. Size (Font)

4.68
(1.44)

8. Legal Language

4.52
(1.62)

2
.27
(1.95)
1.52, n.s.

6

7

8

3

4

5

.36
(2.03)
1.91, n.s.

.87
(1.92)
4.87***

92
(1.81)
5.47***.

.96
(2.19)
4.74***

.98
(1.74)
6.05***

1.14
(2.00)
6.17***

.08
(2.02)
.46, n.s.

.59
(2.10)
3.04**

.64
(1.42)
4.87***

.69
(2.00)
3.71***

.70
(1.35)
5.63***

.87
(1.67)
5.61***

.50
(1.83)
2.98**

.56
(2.04)
2.95**

.60
1.94
3.34***

.62
(1.96)
3.40***

.78
(1.87)
4.49***

.52
(2.04)
.27, n.s.

.09
(1.85)
.55, n.s.

.11
(1.92)
.62, n.s.

.27
(1.92)
1.54, n.s.

.04
(2.12)
.21, n.s.

.06
(.81)
.79, n.s.

.22
(1.55)
1.55, n.s.

.01
(2.11)
.08, n.s.

.18
(1.95)
1.00, n.s.
.16
(1.46)
1.20, n.s.

*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
2 -tailed tests

Ex post. The factors that most strongly influenced consumers' intent to read the SFC ex post were cost of transaction, opportunity to
learn new things and opportunity to change/improve contract terms.
The factors that ranked lowest on intent to read ex post include length
of contract, contract density and font size. To determine whether the
rankings significantly differ from each other, paired t-tests were performed. Results indicate that there is no significant difference between the top two ranking factors, i.e., cost of transaction and
opportunity to learn. Also, there is no significant difference between
the second and third ranking factors, i.e., opportunity to learn and
opportunity to change or improve contract terms.
However, significant differences were found between opportunity
to learn and opportunity to change/improve contract terms (ranking
third) on one hand, and all other lower ranking items on the other.
This indicates that although all of the factors had an impact on intent
to read SFCs ex post, cost of transaction and the opportunity to learn
had a significantly stronger impact in comparison to the other remain-
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ing factors (i.e., opportunity to change/improve contract terms, legal
language, length of contract, density and font size).
TABLE

3.

MEAN SCORES, STANDARD

COMPARISONS

(T-TESTS)

DEVIATIONS, AND PAIRED

OF RATIONAL-ECONOMIC FACTORS

INFLUENCING INTENT TO READ EX POST

Factor

Ex post
Mean
(stdev)

1. Cost of
Transaction

5.77
(1.48)

2. Opportunity to
Learn New Things
About the Contract

5.47
(1.78)

3. Opportunity to
Change or Improve
Contract Terms

5.22
(1.85)

4. Similarity (Other
Car Rental
Contracts)

4.15
(1.97)

5. Legal Language

3.96
(1.89)

6. Length of Contract

3.93
(1.89)

7. Density

3.89
(1.86)

8. Size (Font)

3.88

2
.29
(1.82)
1.73, n.s.

6

7

.55
(1.77)
3.35***

3

1. 62
(2.02)
8.64***

4

1.81
(1.94)
10.01***

5

1.83
(1.89)
10.42***

1.87,
(1.88)
10.76***

1.88
(1.88)
10.80***

8

.25
(1.86)
1.49, n.s.

1.32
(2.12)
6.72***

1.51
(2.32)
7.04**

1.54
(2.34)
7.07***

1.58
(2.41)
7.08***

1.59
(2.39)
7.15***

1.06
(2.01)
5.72***

1.25
(2.28)
5.93***

1.28
2.20
6.27***

1.32
(2.19)
6.51***

1.33
(2.15)
6.69***

.19
1.73)
1.17, n.s.

.21
(1.96)
1.17 n.s.

.25
(1.93)
1.14, n.s.

.26
(1.83)
1.56, n.s.

.02
(1.23)

.06
(1.26)

.78
(1.25)

.22, n.s.

.58, n.s.

.66, n.s.

.04
(1.00)

.05
(0.99)

.46, n.s.

.56, n.s.

.00
(0.58)
.15, n.s.

(1.88)

*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
2-tailed tests

C.

Discussion and Implications

In general terms, all the factors examined in this study clearly influence consumers' intended contracting behavior. However, some factors are more dominant than others. Based on the findings of this
study, the discussion below includes some preliminary yet tailored recommendations for regulators and administrators - who regulate consumer transactions or promote efficiency and fairness at the ex ante
stage - and for courts, which protect consumers from hidden biased
terms after a legal dispute has surfaced.
Some commentators logically argue that expensive consumer transactions should be closely scrutinized. The rationale for regulating
markets where expensive transactions are at stake is fairly straightforward: the fear that consumers will suffer greatly from imperfect information in such markets, where high-priced goods or services are

2010]

THE LAW OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS

223

purchased. Nevertheless, insofar as imperfect information is indeed
the main concern that worries academics and policymakers, our study
casts doubt on the wisdom of regulating, first and foremost, expensive
consumer transactions. Consumers report that the cost of the transaction at stake has the strongest influence on their propensity to read
the contract.50 This means that consumers who enter expensive deals
are more likely to take more precautions, such as, inter alia, reading
the contract prior to entering the agreement, and hence, becoming
acquainted with its content.51 From this perspective, consumers might
in fact need less protection against hidden terms in costly transactions,
not more. 52
As we have seen, the second most important factor in consumers'
decision whether or not to read an SFC ex ante is the length of the
contract.53 A long contract deters consumers from reading it, whereas
a short one enhances the likelihood that they will. Regulators and
consumer protection proponents may do well to focus their attention
on shortening contracts. Since the length of the contract does not deter consumers from reading SFCs ex post,5 4 such initiatives are most
valuable in fields of commerce where a strong ex post-ex ante information flow is not present.
Diverse reasons contribute to the phenomenon of drafting long contracts. However, employing various means can mitigate this reality.
A few such suggestions follow - regrettably very truncated. One possibility is to use a pre-approval mechanism, which will approve fair
and efficient contract terms while flagging or framing problematic
ones. 56 Another is to allow consumer protection bodies to compare
50. Assuming they can correctly asses it, of course. This correlates with the results of the
second study of Stark & Choplin, supra note 7, at 694, which indicate that consumers are more
likely to read SFCs when important transactions are at stake.
51. This is aside from the fact that consumers typically consult a legal expert once a very
expensive purchase, such as a home purchase, is at stake.
52. However, protection against other unfair practices - rather than hidden biased contractual
provisions - might indeed be warranted. Our policy recommendations refer merely to protection from biased contract terms.
53. Interestingly, this finding contradicts the first study of Stark & Choplin, supra note 7, at
678-80, which suggests that even when the SFC is rather short (just over two pages), consumers
will nevertheless tend not to read it. However, it should be clear that the various factors work
together. Thus, for instance, it might be that where the importance of the transaction is negligible, consumers will not read even short forms.
54. One possible explanation for this difference is that reading ex post is focused, centered on
the problem that surfaced (rather than on the contract as a whole).
55. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with
Fewer Words, 79 CHI. KENT L. REv. 889 (2004) (arguing that American contracts are long and
detailing the possible reasons for this phenomenon).
56. See Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747 (2009) (developing the
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the different contracts that can be found in any given field, and to
publicize the results. This may promote the reputation of sellers who
use short contracts. Additionally, governmental agencies and consumer organizations might provide consumers with websites that invite consumers to share their thoughts and insights about the contracts
they are offered ("How's my contract?" websites).57 In these sites,
special attention ought to be paid to the length of the contracts.
Next is the possibility of changing or improving the terms of SFCs.
Our respondents reported that this was the third factor that influenced their intent whether to read SFCs ex ante as well as ex post.
Actually, this facet goes back to the notorious "take-it-or-leave-it" nature of SFCs. Much ink has been spilt on this issue, and many writings
base their consumer protection agenda on the fact that consumers
cannot negotiate or alter form contract clauses. Consequently, legislatures and courts might indeed be wary wherever consumers cannot
change the contracts that vendors offer. This is not necessarily because consumers lack the ability to negotiate the terms sellers offer,
but because this reality undermines consumers' willingness to read
SFCs in the first place.
At the same time, in some areas of commerce - such as Digital
Rights Management (DRM) - consumers can choose some of the features of the relevant contract.5 In these areas of commerce, ex ante
regulatory intervention seems much less justified. Once again, this is
so not only because consumers can in fact choose some contractual
components in the contract they enter. Rather, it is the mere possibility of choosing one's terms that implies a greater tendency by consumers to read the contract (even if the consumer chooses to stick to the
proposed/default terms). Hence, regulators should promote additional
tools that encourage and broaden consumers' ability to choose the
terms of their contracts, thus promoting consumers' tendency to read
SFCs.
idea of a third-party pre-approval mechanism for SFCs); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the
'Opportunity to Read' in Contract Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=1162922.
57. See, e.g., http://www.gripe2ed.com/scoop/; www.eff.org.wp/eula.php (collecting examples
of unfavorable terms); www.fairterms.org/EULALibrary.htm (collecting links to sites with biased terms). Interestingly, the efficacy of online social networks and their power to generate
consumer resentment, and thus combat unfair contract terms, has been recently illustrated in the
context of Facebook's attempt to change its TOS (Terms of Service). For one report, see Daniel
Lonescu, Facebook's Zuckerberg Calms Privacy Fears Over TOS Change, PC WORLD, Feb. 17,
2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/159636/facebooks-zuckerberg-calms-privacy-fears-overtos.change.html?loomiaow=t:al6:gl2:r:c.524434:b22071290.
58. In such relevant transactions, consumers can choose the duration of use, the allowed uses,
and so on.
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Moreover, attributing much significance to the possibility of changing or improving terms may support the fear that sellers will discriminate among their consumers ex post. As explained, this can be done
by providing relief to assertive or vocal consumers, regardless of the
contract's language. Such (ex post) discrimination implies that sophisticated or assertive consumers will obtain relief after a dispute arises,
whereas lay consumers - who do not persist on their claims - will

not.59 As consumers consider the possibility of improving contract
terms an important factor in their decision to read SFCs at the ex post

stage, the concern that sellers will indeed choose to discriminate ex
post is further aggravated.
To foster contract reading, commentators and legislatures advocate
for plain language laws. 60 Such initiatives suggest encouraging (or
obliging) sellers to use simple language that reasonably educated consumers are able to understand, rather than legal gobbledygook. This
has influenced not only legislatures but public campaigns as well. 6 1
Arguably, using plain language makes it easy for consumers to become familiar with SFCs.
Quite surprisingly, however, our study indicates that the legal language used in SFCs proved the weakest of the rational-economic factors we examined in propelling consumers' tendency not to read SFCs
ex ante. Legal jargon was not one of the key factors at the ex post
stage, either. 62 This is also true with respect to contracts' visual features, i.e., font size and print density. These were less significant when

the respondents were deciding whether they would tend to read the
contract, both ex ante and ex post. According to these findings, regulating the visual aspects of the contract will not necessarily yield a real
change in consumer contracting behavior. Hence, legislatures and
courts should not focus primarily on such factors.
59. See also Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 30 (noting that reputation concerns will lead vendors to insist on one-sided contract terms only in response to opportunistic behavior on the part
of buyers); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain:An Economic Theory of how StandardForm Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 857, 876 (2006) (providing anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that virtually everything relating to SFCs can be re-negotiated ex post if consumers adopt an assertive attitude). In
addition, some have argued that people, and especially women, fear the negotiation procedure.
In such cases, even if negotiating might result in better terms, those consumers who fear the
process will choose not to read the SFC or negotiate its terms. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 7,
at 670-71.

60. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.29-36 (2010).
61. See, e.g., Plain English Campaign, http://sl90934979.websitehome.co.uk/ (last visited May
26, 2010).
62. Yet, there is the possibility that our respondents - some of whom are law school students.did not attribute much importance to this factor, due to their skills and education. Further research is warranted at this point.
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At this point, two qualifications are in order. First, as we emphasize
throughout this Essay, we rely on consumers' reports regarding their
inclination to read SFCs. We did not measure actual consumer behavior. Of course, there might be a difference between what consumers
report and how they actually respond. 63 Although measuring intended behavior is an acceptable method, we acknowledge that selfreporting measures are naturally subject to sampling errors. In this
context, consumers as a class might err in assessing the impact of the
contracts' font size and print density (for instance) on their willingness
to read. Therefore, we hope that future research will focus on the
measurement of actual consumer behavior, in laboratory or real-life
field settings, and use different techniques, such as observation and
interviewing. Second, we do not argue that plain language initiatives
or regulating font size are useless. As noted, all the factors presented
in this study do seem to influence the way consumers behave. We do
claim, however, that other factors seem to play a more central role in
consumers' decision-making, and thus should receive more scholarly
and regulatory attention.
Last is the assumption that consumers do not read SFCs because (at
least in some industries) sellers often offer similar contracts. Interestingly, the data of this study illustrates that similarity among contracts
is not one of the most important key factors - either ex ante or ex post
- in consumers' decisions on whether to read a contract. 64 Hence, contrary to common views, similarity among contracts is not the leading
rationale for justifying special and strong regulatory scrutiny or judicial intervention.
We would like to end this discussion with a caveat. The second
study presented in this part involved one scenario in one culture. Although Western common-law countries share many fundamental (le63. Furthermore, the sample population of this study was comprised of students pursuing
bachelors or masters degrees. It may be argued that this sample is not representative of the
general population, and that no student would openly admit to waive the opportunity to learn
new and important things (especially when this knowledge may significantly impact the type of
services to which they will or will not be entitled). In other words, using a student population
may limit how generalized of these results. However, we note again the heterogeneous group of
students in our sample. We hope that our findings will guide future research that will focus on
measuring actual consumer behavior in similar scenarios. Until such data is gathered and analyzed, the results of this study can definitely be of real significance to researchers, legislators and
policymakers.
64. This finding can be explained in a few ways. First, consumers might assume that reading a
contract and becoming familiar with its content will allow them to decide whether to pursue the
transaction. Second, becoming familiar with a contract is an effort that might serve consumers
later on when considering the same transaction in the future. Third, contracts might be similar
but not identical. Thus, consumers who become familiar with the pitfalls and advantages of one
contract might focus their attention on similar aspects when shopping among other contracts.
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gal and societal) concepts, one's attitude toward reading legal
documents, such as an SFC, might be shaped by context, societal
norms and cultural habits. Accordingly, we hope that future studies
examine additional scenarios across different cultures.
V.

CONCLUSION

The literature provides competing narratives about consumer contracting behavior, all different in nature. One narrative assumes that
consumers simply do not read SFCs, and are thus exposed to biased
contracts. Another presumes that a substantial minority of consumers
read contracts and discipline sellers, and thus, that there is basically no
need to intervene in competitive consumer markets. A third speculates that consumers tend to read contracts after the fact. According
to this claim, consumer protection initiatives are mostly justified
where a strong information flow from experienced consumers (who
read ex post) to potential consumers (at the ex ante stage) does not
exist.
Each narrative rests on different assumptions. Not surprisingly,
therefore, academics propose and advance diverse solutions to the alleged problems that consumer contracts pose to traditional contract
law. Some reveal a strong tendency to regulate consumer transactions
ex ante. Others call on courts to be active in protecting consumers
from one-sided contracts. Yet others doubt whether legal intervention
is cost-effective, and whether it is indeed required. One way or another, consumer contract law is largely based on assumptions that
have never been contested.
This Essay aspired to broaden our understanding as to the real nature of consumer contracting behavior. To achieve this goal, we designed two studies. The first examined consumers' intent to read
SFCs, whereas the second explored the rational-economic factors that
influence that intent. We hope that the results of these studies can
assist courts and legislatures in their efforts to better mitigate the
problems caused by SFCs. Of course, this is merely a first and modest
step. Consumers' contracting behavior raises many intriguing issues
yet to be explored.

